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Fertility will be determined by the changing ideal
family size and the empowerment to reach these
targets
Wolfgang Lutz1,∗
The long-term fertility trends in different parts of the world will matter greatly for
sustainable development and future human well-being on this planet. Progress in the
global demographic transition and the resulting changes in the sizes and structures
of human populations have been shown to be key drivers of modern economic
growth through several mechanisms. Unified Growth Theory (Galor 2011) clearly
demonstrates how the increase in human capital associated with the shift from
the quantity to the quality of children has been driving economic development.
This has also been shown by the extensive literature on the demographic dividend
(Bloom and Williamson 1998; Lutz et al. 2019). But the future paths of fertility
and the resulting population growth have also been identified as important factors
in efforts to deal with climate change and other environmental risks (Bongaarts and
O’Neill 2018). The effect of fertility on economic growth and environmental change
may be even more important than the challenges posed by population growth in
providing people with the ability to live a life of dignity and freedom from poverty,
as stipulated by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is clearly harder
to meet all of these goals while leaving no one behind – one of the key SDG
principles – if the world population continues to grow rapidly. Among the Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP), the Stalled Development Scenario (SSP3) projects
that the global population will grow to around 14 billion people by the end of the
century, while the Rapid Development Scenario (SSP1) projects a corresponding
figure of just seven billion (Lutz et al. 2018). This difference by a factor of two,
which is mostly due to different fertility assumptions, will have serious implications
for future human well-being.
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Where future population growth will come to lie between these two rather extreme
scenarios will essentially depend on two factors: the speed of fertility decline in
Africa and the long-term fertility level at the end of demographic transition. In this
contribution to the demographic debate, I will argue that for both factors, changes
in the ideal family size – which I will use here synonymously with the desired
family size – are the key drivers. Moreover, I will show that these changes primarily
happen in our minds, and are only secondarily influenced by changing economic
realities and environmental factors. Another reason why I prefer to use the notion
of the ideal family size is that it is directly linked to the notion of developmental
idealism, which has been discussed extensively with respect to family norms by
Arland Thornton (2005). This approach is based on the premise that our actions
are a consequence of our norms, and of what we consider as good and desirable
in our minds. But before we can realize these desires, we need to be empowered
to do so. This empowerment has several dimensions, which go from women being
able to convince their partners – and, in some societies, their extended family and
peers as well – to allow them to pursue their family size desires, to having access
to acceptable means of contraception and reproductive health services (including
medically assisted reproduction). As I will argue below, for many of the dimensions
of this process of reproductive empowerment, female education is a decisive factor.
The future of Africa’s fertility
Much has been written about the drivers of fertility decline in Africa, and I will not
attempt to summarize this literature here. I only aim to selectively highlight a few
recent insights into this complex topic. In the 2010 issue of the Vienna Yearbook
of Population Research on the topic of education and demography, John Bongaarts
published a paper entitled “The causes of educational differences in fertility in Sub-
Saharan Africa” (Bongaarts 2010), in which he clearly showed that the main reason
for the high fertility in Africa is that the desired family size is large. More educated
women have both a smaller desired family size and fewer unwanted births. Hence,
education has a dual effect on lowering fertility: i.e., it reduces the ideal family
size, presumably through changes in values and in the associated quantity/quality
considerations; and it empowers women to actually realize this smaller family size
by averting unwanted births.
This pattern of explanation has recently been confirmed by two highly compre-
hensive studies (Kebede 2019; Kebede et al. 2019) that pooled all the individual-
level data from all African countries and for all years that are available from the
DHS (Demographic and Health Survey), which enabled the authors to study more
than 1.8 million births to more than 500,000 women. One interesting finding from a
multi-level study of differentials in the ideal family size (Kebede 2019) was that at
each level (individual, community, and country) the effect of education was stronger
than that of income, and that the effect of education was particularly strong at the
community level. This implies that even less educated women who were living in a
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village with more educated women had smaller ideal family sizes, presumably due
to processes of normative diffusion and social learning (Kebede 2019). A cohort-
specific analysis of fertility showed that the much-discussed stalling of the fertility
decline around 2000 in some African countries can be largely explained by an
earlier stalling of improvements in education – possibly in association with the
structural adjustment programs of the 1980s – among the female cohorts who
entered their prime childbearing ages around 2000 (Kebede et al. 2019). Here again
it was apparent that more educated women wanted to have fewer children, and were
finding better ways to actually have fewer children. And given that the education
of girls has picked up again in many African countries since 2000, a rather rapid
decline in fertility over the coming years seems likely.
Fertility levels at the end of demographic transition
In Africa and in some countries in Western Asia where fertility is still rather high,
the factors that will lead to fertility decline are relatively clear, and the only open
question is the exact timing of this decline. By contrast, the main drivers of and
the long-term trends in fertility are much more uncertain in populations that have
reached the end of the demographic transition. Here we are groping in the dark, and
only feel confident in saying that the long-held view that all countries will ultimately
converge to the so-called replacement level of 2.1 is untenable, and without a
scientific basis. This perspective appears to reflect some sort of belief in homeostasis
that assumes that there is an inherent tendency of populations to reach a state of
equilibrium in which they neither grow nor decline. This view has also been rein-
forced by the ubiquity of the United Nations population projections. For decades,
these projections had assumed that life expectancy would stabilize at a certain level,
which had to be shifted upward repeatedly as reality surpassed previous estimates;
and that fertility in all countries would converge to the replacement level, and thus
reach a point of permanent stability after a period of some turmoil caused by the
demographic regime changes associated with the demographic transition. This view
was also politically convenient for the United Nations, because it told governments
that conditions would stabilize: i.e., that their populations would neither explode nor
shrink and ultimately disappear. Unfortunately, reality has turned out to be different,
as today an increasing number of governments – mostly in Eastern Europe – are
deeply concerned about depopulation, not only due to low fertility, but to out-
migration.
In global population projections, the long-term fertility target has now been
lowered from 2.1 to somewhere between 1.75 and 1.85 (United Nations 2019; Lutz
et al. 2014). However, there is no convincing scientific rationale for these estimates.
Hence, one may ask why such long-term projections are even produced. The
problem is that long-term population projections are needed for many purposes –
e.g., the study of climate change and the human populations affected in different
parts of the world – and that in making such projections, one must assume some
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TFRs over the long term, even if the scientific basis for doing so is very tenuous.
Gietel-Basten et al. (2013) have presented some sensitivity analyses of the very long-
term implications of different ultimate fertility levels. In the scenarios that assume a
maximum life expectancy at birth of 100 years, and that the stated fertility levels will
be reached in all parts of the world by 2050, a long-term TFR of 1.75 would result
in a world population of 8.5 billion in 2100, 5.6 billion in 2200, and 3.2 billion in
2300. If the TFRs converge to 2.0 by 2050, the long-term population size would be
in the 10-11 billion range over the coming centuries. If, however, the TFRs converge
to 1.5 – which is around the current European average – the world population would,
after peaking at 8.6 billion, decline to 6.9 billion by 2100, and further decline to 2.7
billion in 2200 and 0.9 billion in 2300. In other words, the current European levels,
which are still higher than the levels currently observed in East Asia, would, in the
very long run, bring the world population down to below one billion – that is, to the
level that humanity experienced throughout its entire history up until around 1800.
These purely hypothetical scenario calculations show that minor differences in
fertility levels can have massive consequences for long-term population size. And
my point here is that the question of whether a TFR is 1.50 rather than 1.75 or 2.00
will primarily depend on the ideal that is in people’s minds as to what number of
children is associated with living a successful and happy life.
Revisiting the low fertility trap hypothesis (LFTH)
In 2006, Lutz, Skirbekk, and Testa published a paper in the Vienna Yearbook of
Population Research that was entitled “The low fertility trap hypothesis: Forces that
may lead to further postponement and fewer births in Europe” (Lutz et al. 2006).
The underlying concept was based on the following hierarchy for fertility and births.
First, personal ideal family size is assumed to be the fundamental driver of fertility,
which is then transformed into a specific family size target when conflicting interests
and constraints are taken into account. In a next step, these fertility targets are
translated into period fertility rates that are sensitive to choices around the timing of
births. Finally, period fertility rates are translated into certain absolute numbers of
births in a given calendar year for which the changing age structure of the population
is also taken into consideration. At each of these steps, external influences come
into play that partly represent feedbacks from earlier fertility levels, as is evident
in the case of the age structure of the population and the number of young people
entering reproductive ages. But the key hypothesis of LFTH is that the most basic
underlying determinant – namely, personal ideal family size – is in part determined
by how young people have been socialized, and by what they see as the new norms
pursued by other people around them. These experiences shape young people’s own
norms about family size. This can also be seen as feedback from earlier declines in
fertility that resulted in smaller actual family sizes, and which, in turn, influenced
the family size norms of the next generation. This mechanism by itself could result
Wolfgang Lutz 5
in a downward spiral of ever-lower fertility and ever-smaller actual family sizes,
even if no other factors come into play.
In 2008 in a paper discussing LFTH in Europe and East Asia, I asked the question:
“Has Korea’s fertility reached the bottom?” (Lutz 2008). At that time, the TFR in
South Korea was 1.25, and few people believed it could fall any lower. In 2018 and
2019, the Korean TFR has actually fallen below 1.0. While this very low period
fertility level is likely due in part to tempo effects that are a consequence of the
postponement of births, to what extent fertility in South Korea will recover over the
coming years is not at all clear. Following the LFTH framework, this very low level
could also be due to changes in either the ideal family size, important competing
aspirations and conflicts that result in lower target fertility, or a combination of
the two. There is not yet enough empirical evidence to disentangle these different
determinants of fertility in East Asia. But in the urban areas of China, there is some
evidence that after many years of living under the one-child policy, and in a situation
in which most couples actually have only one child, the one-child family has become
the new norm, with a large majority of couples saying that they want to have only
one child, even though they are now allowed to have two (Basten and Jiang 2015).
In Europe, by contrast, the two-child norm still seems to be dominant, at least until
recently (Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014). Over the last decade, a rather unexpected
decline in fertility rates has been observed in several European countries, including
in the Nordic countries. This pattern in the Nordic countries is particularly puzzling
given that these countries used to be seen as the prime examples for the premise that
ensuring the compatibility of work and family and having generous child support
systems will result in relatively high fertility levels. In Norway, for example, the
TFR has declined from 1.96 in 2008 to 1.56 in 2018. In Finland, the TFR has
declined from 1.85 to 1.40 over the same period, without any clearly identifiable
social, economic, or family policy changes having occurred. Demography is still
groping in the dark for explanations for these changes. It appears, however, that
there may well have been some ongoing cultural changes in these societies that
have affected the relative importance of children, and, as a consequence, the ideal
family size.
Empowered to better reach one’s ideal family size
In an earlier Demographic Debate in the 2017 Vienna Yearbook on education
and fertility in low-fertility settings, I gave my contribution the title: “Education
empowers women to reach their personal fertility target, regardless of what that
target is” (Lutz 2017). In this paper, I also explained some of the mechanisms
through which the cognitive learning experiences associated with education tend
to strengthen abstraction skills, lengthen the planning horizon, and even improve
self-control. These benefits are in addition to the more widely recognized effects
of education, which include having better access to information and the ability to
earn a higher income. These are all key aspects of the empowerment of women,
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which, among many other good things, improve their chances of realizing whatever
their family size ideals are. I have discussed this contribution of female education to
fertility decline in Africa above. But this empowerment effect is also present in many
low-fertility countries. It can help explain why in some countries a U-shape emerges
in the relationship between education and fertility. Assume for the time being that
the ideal family size is two children for all women, irrespective of education. In
such a scenario, women with low education will tend to have relatively high levels of
fertility, because there is still a degree of fatalism in their reproductive behavior, and
higher proportions of their births are likely to be unplanned. On the other extreme,
women with high education will tend to be able to plan their life more effectively,
even if they often have to deal with difficult trade-offs between advancing their
career and establishing a family. But they will also tend to have higher levels of
human and social capital that will enable them to better combine work and family
life, and, therefore, to come closer to their ideal of having two children than women
with intermediate income levels, who are likely to struggle more to make ends meet,
and to combine work and family life in a satisfactory manner. Thus, this latter group
of women are likely to have somewhat lower fertility. Hence, these differences in
the empowerment of women can help to explain the emerging U-shape in several
countries.
I still believe that this narrative is plausible and probably right. But in that case,
why don’t we observe a U-shape with respect to education in all low-fertility
countries? The reason is that not all women in a given country have the same
ideal family size, and they are even less likely to have identical family size targets.
Empirically observed fertility differentials tend to result from a mixture of the ideal
family size and empowerment effects. While I still believe that the empowerment
effect is universal in all cultures and at different levels of the fertility transition, the
ideal family size can differ considerably. For example, highly educated orthodox
Jewish women in Israel often want very large families, and manage to have very
large families. But in other countries, large proportions of highly educated women
have evidently accepted that having children is not compatible with having a career,
and manage these trade-offs by staying childless. Thus, in the long run, culturally
and socially determined family size desires may result in very different fertility
levels.
Is there something in our genes that will ensure that a certain minimal level of
fertility is maintained? From a purely biological perspective, the sex drive seems
to be the main mechanism that evolution produced for ensuring that there will be
sufficient reproduction. This is also reflected in Robert Malthus’ famous statement
that fertility is unlikely to decline because “the passion between the sexes will
never diminish” (Malthus 1798). But thanks to contraception, fertility around the
world has declined without the passion having diminished. Reproduction has now
mostly entered the realm of conscious choice (Coale 1973). And where will this
conscious choice lead us? I got the clearest answer to all of these crucial questions
from the leading evolutionary biologist Simon Levin of Princeton. In response to
my question of whether human evolution will ensure a certain minimum level of
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reproduction, his short answer was: “Once reproduction is culturally determined,
cultural evolution can bring you almost anywhere.” And the key mechanism through
which culture works in this context is via the shaping of the ideal family size as the
fundamental determinant of future fertility.
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